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SIXTY YEARS OF COMPULSORY EUGENIC
STERILIZATION: "THREE GENERATIONS OF
IMBECILES" AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES
CHARLES P. KINDREGAN*
It is . . . the policy of the state to prevent the procreation and
increase in number of feebleminded, insane and epileptic persons,
idiots, imbeciles, moral degenerates, and sexual perverts likely to
become a menace to society.'
INCE 1907 almost seventy-thousand persons2 have been compul-
sorily sterilized in the United States under a theory that they
constitute a threat to society. This practice is based on the theory
of eugenics, first propounded by Sir Francis Galton in 1883. Eu-
genics developed from the belief that human defects are transmis-
sible from parents to children so that the improvement of the race
requires the sterilization of defective persons. The theory was
implemented by the convictions of the eugenicists that defective
human beings breed more frequently than normal persons and
thereby threaten to flood society with inferior, criminal and un-
productive children. Among the defects which the early eugenicists
proposed t6 eliminate through sterilization were feeblemindedness,
insanity, criminal tendencies, epilepsy, inebriation, drug addiction,
tuberculosis, syphilis, blindness, deafness, physical deformities,
unproductive dependency such as pauperism, economic failure and
orphanism8
0BA., cum laude, M.A., LaSalle College, Philadelphia. J.D., with honor, Chicago-
Kent College of Law. Mr. Kindregan has taught at V.M.I., St. Mary's College, and the
College of Arts and Sciences of Loyola University. He is a member of the Illinois Bar.
I Mich. Comp. Laws ch. 720, § 301 (1948).
2 Based on statistics collected and published by the Human Betterment Association
of America.
3 Defects listed in the Model Eugenic Sterilization Law proposed in Eugenic Sterili-
123
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The eugenic theory gained great popularity in the United
States at the beginning of the twentieth century, and interest in
it was increased by its widespread elaboration in magazines and
lectures. Combined with the popularity of ideas about familial
degeneracy and case studies of such notorious blood lines as the
Jukes, the Nams and the Kallikaks, the period between 1900 and
1937 witnessed a rising demand that the goals of eugenics be en-
forced through legislation. In 1905 the legislature of Pennsylvania
passed a compulsory eugenic sterilization bill (hereafter referred
to as CES), but Governor Pennypacker vetoed it. Indiana became
the first state to authorize CES in 1907; Washington adopted it a
few months later.4 Twenty-nine states subsequently approved CES;
twenty-five states currently permit CES.5
The provisions of these CES statutes now in force will be
examined in relation to constitutional questions which courts
and commentators have asked about such statutes. These questions
have not been raised in an appellate court since 1942, but the
absence of cases does not mean that the questions have been
answered to the satisfaction of the legal community. Although
some may feel that the constitutionality of CES is ". . . . no longer
a debatable issue so long as procedural safeguards such as notice,
hearing, and judicial review are provided for and observed,"' the
overwhelming number of legal commentators see constitutional
difficulties of a substantive nature in the CES statutes.7 Inasmuch
zation in the United States (1922), quoted by Montagu, Human Heredity 257 (paper-
back edition, 1960).
4 Both statutes were subsequently held unconstitutional. Williams v. Smith, 190
Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921); In Re Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942).
5 Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Adverse judicial determinations in Nevada, New Jersey, New
York and Washington caused those states to abandon CES. The legislature of Kansas
recently became the first to totally repeal a CES law without the pressure of an adverse
court holding, Sess. Laws of Kan. ch. 477, § 1 (1965). Two states, Vermont and Minnesota,
permit voluntary eugenic sterilization; VES is outside the scope of the present study.
Eugenic sterilization is illegal, and frequently criminal, in twenty-three states; exceptions
to the latter statement may be Ohio and Maryland, where some case law allowing a
probate court to order a eugenic sterilization exists.
0 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1359, 1360 (1963).
7 See Bligh, Sterilization and Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1965); Kalven,
A Special Corner of Civil Liberties, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1234 (1965); O'Hara and Sanks,
Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20 (1956); Zenoff, Reappraisal of Eugenic Sterilization
Laws, 10 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 149 (1961); 38 Ind. L.J. 275 (1963); 35 Iowa L. Rev. 253
(1950); 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 738 (1964).
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as hundreds of persons will be ordered to submit to a vasectomy or
salpingectomys during the coming year, a court may soon have to
examine CES in the light of contemporary scientific knowledge
and recent legal developments.
CES AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Is the sterilization of a defective person a cruel and unusual
punishment within the prohibition of the eighth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and similar prohibitions in the
constitutions of the diverse states?9 Whether sterilization is in-
herently cruel was first asked in State v. Feilen.10 A criminal defen-
dant had been sentenced to undergo a sterilization following his
conviction on a charge of statutory rape. The defendant argued
that sterilization was in itself a cruel punishment,1 and thus was
beyond the constitutional power of the state. The Supreme Court
of Washington, however, held that since the state could have
imposed the death penalty for the defendant's brutal and revolting
crime it could certainly require him to submit to a lesser penalty
such as vasectomy. Cruelty was equated with torture, and steriliza-
tion was not torture.
A directly opposite result was reached in a 1914 case, Davis v.
Berry. 2 The Iowa statute required the sterilization of twice-con-
victed felons, a punitive measure with eugenic underpinnings. The
8 Several CES statutes require the use of these operations. Vasectomy is a cutting
of the vas deferens in the male; salpingectomy is a cutting or tying of the fallopian
tubes in the female. Both are reversible in theory, but fecundity cannot always be
restored in fact. Statutes not specifying these operations would probably allow hysterec-
tomy (removal of the uterus), oophorectomy (removal of the ovaries), or use of same
treatment such as radiation. All of these would be final.
Neb. Rev.-Stat. ch. 83, §§ 501-509 (1956), would probably allow castration of males.
Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code, § 6624 (1937), forbids castration for eugenic purposes, but
Cal. Pen. Code, § 2670 (1960), would probably allow it when its purpose is both puni-
tive and eugenic. All other states forbid castration.
An objection to one form of sterilization as distinguished from another has never
been raised in an appellate court. Failure to specify whether a sterilization was to be
by vasectomy or castration was fatal to a CES order in Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80,
276 Pac. 921 (1929).
9 The constitutions of all CES states forbid cruel and unusual punishment except
the Constitution of Connecticut. The presence or absence of the prohibition in a state
constitution is not important since the standards of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution have been applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 Sup. Ct. 1417 (1962).
10 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912).
11 The Constitution of Washington forbade only cruel punishment.
12 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
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plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of an order for his steril-
ization under this provision. A federal district court issued the
injunction, holding that the forced submission to an operation of
vasectomy would constitute a cruel and unusual punishment under
the Constitution of the United States. The decision noted that the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments originated in
the English Bill of Rights of 1688. The fact that castration, which
had been commonly used as a punishment before 1688, was never
used in England after the Bill of Rights indicates that it was con-
sidered cruel and unusual. The court admitted specific differences
between sterilization by vasectomy and castration, but felt that
since both evoke the same shame, humiliation, degradation and
mental torture by forced surrender of manly biological power, the
differences were more of degree than kind.
The decision in the Davis case was followed by another federal
district court in Mickle v. Henrichs 8 The plaintiff, an epileptic,
had been convicted of rape in Nevada. The sentencing judge or-
dered him sterilized under a CES statute. An injunction against
the enforcement of the order was issued, the court holding that
such a sterilization would violate the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment contained in the Nevada Constituton. The
court rejected the lesser penalty argument which had been accepted
by the court in State v. Feilen14:
.... If life is spared, it should not be unnecessarily obstructed
... for him and society, a fair opportunity to retrieve his fall isquite as important as the eugenic possibilities of sterilization.15
Thus, for the first time, the question of whether CES could be
punitive, and as punishment be cruel and unusual, was answered
in the affirmative. The court held that a cruel and unusual punish-
ment cannot be exacted under ". . . . theories of race culture."'1
However, dictum in a contemporaneous New York decision stressed
that sterilization under a CES statute could not be cruel and
unusual punishment because there was no punitive intent.17
13 262 Fed. 688 (D. Nev. 1918).
14 Supra note 10.
15 Supra note 13, at 691.
16 Supra note 13, at 688.
17 Osborn v. Thomson, 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N.Y. Supp. 1094 (1918), aflirining
In Re Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
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In 1925, the Supreme Court of Michigan became the first
American court to uphold a eugenic sterilization order against the
argument that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment:
. Under the existing circumstances it was not only [the state's]
... right, but its duty to enact some legislation that would protect
the people and preserve the race from the known effects of the
procreation of children by the feebleminded, the idiots, and the
imbeciles.18
Four years later a prisoner in the Utah penitentiary was ordered
sterilized after being discovered in an act of sodomy in his cell.
The Supreme Court of the state upheld an injunction against the
order on the grounds that an isolated act of moral degeneracy
would not reasonably indicate that the man would produce in-
adequate offspring. 9 Language in the decision indicated that the
court felt an ostensibly eugenic sterilization was being administered
as punishment. In 1931, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the
sterilization of an imbecile, whose father and eleven brothers and
sisters were feebleminded, was not punitive and therefore could not
be a cruel and unusual punishment. 20 A contemporaneous Ne-
braska decision reached the same conclusion, but strongly worded
dicta made clear the court's belief that a separate provision of the
statute allowing the sterilization of habitual criminals and sexual
perverts was contrary to the cruel and unusual punishment pro-
hibition.21 The cruel and unusual punishment argument was re-
jected in an Oklahoma decision in 193322 and in an advisory
opinion given to the Governor of Alabama by the Supreme Court
of that state two years later.23
Whether CES is a cruel and unusual punishment is still an open
question. There particularly is doubt about the status of statutes
which call for sterilization of criminals on eugenic grounds. The
two decisions which enjoined sterilization orders on the grounds
that they constituted cruel and unusual punishments involved
convicted felons. 4 Several of the decisions in which no eighth
18 Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 414, 204 N.W. 140, 142 (1925); a similar
conclusion was reached in In re Salloum, 236 Mich. 498, 210 N.W. 478 (1926).
19 Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921 (1929).
20 State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 Pac. 668 (1931).
21 Clayton v. Board of Examiners of Defectives, 120 Neb. 680, 234 N.W. 630 (1931).
22 In Re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 P.2d 153 (1933).
23 In Re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935).
24 Davis v. Berry, 215 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914); Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 688
(D. Nev. 1918).
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amendment violations were found were expressly limited by the
courts to the sterilization of non-criminal defectives.2 5
Eight states currently make criminality grounds for CES.
Delaware permits the sterilization of any person convicted of three
felonies if his criminality is caused by a mental abnormality or
disease.28 Connecticut permits the sterilization of any prisoner who
has an inheritable tendency to crime. Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska and
North Dakota sterilize moral degenerates, sexual perverts and
habitual criminals.28 Utah permits the sterilization of any person
in the state who is afflicted with habitual, degenerate, sexual,
criminal tendencies.29 California sterilizes any prisoner who has
been convicted twice of rape, attempted rape or seduction; or any
prisoner who has been convicted three times of any other crime and
gives evidence of being morally or sexually degenerate or perverted;
or anyone who is under a life sentence and shows continuing
evidence of moral or sexual depravity."0 None of these statutes has
so far been tested in relation to eighth amendment standards.
All twenty-five CES statutes allow the sterilization of non-
criminal defectives. Eighth amendment objections to these provi-
sions are not so strong, and no appellate court has ever held the
sterilization of a mental defective or epileptic to be a cruel and
unusual punishment unless he was also a convicted felon. Never-
theless, recent legal developments indicate that the courts may
be receptive to the argument in the future. The eugenic advocates
see people who are mentally or physically inferior as dangerous
aggressors against society. The CES statutes are worded in terms
25 Osborn v. Thomson, 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N.Y. Supp. 1094 (1918); State v.
Troutman, supra note 20; Clayton v. Board of Examiners of Defectives, supra note 21.
26 Del. Code tit. 16, §1 5701-5705 (1953).
27 Conn. Gen. Stat. tit. 17, ch. 299, §§ 17-19 (1958).
28 Idaho Code tit. 66, §1 801-812 (1947); Iowa Code ch. 145, § 1022 (1946); Neb. Rev.
Stat. ch. 83, §§ 501-509 (1956); N.D. Cent. Code tit. 23, §§ 0801-0815 (1960).
29 Utah Code Ann. tit. 64, ch. 10, §§ 1-14 (1953).
30 Cal. Pen. Code tit. 1, § 2670 (1960). Although this is part of the Penal Code, and
separate from the CES provision found in Cal. Wel. and Inst. Code, § 6624 (1937), the
statute is eugenic rather than punitive in form. However, California does have an
expressly punitive sterilization statute which applies to those convicted of carnal abuse
of a child under ten years of age. Cal. Pen. Code tit. 45, § 645 (1960). Nebraska also has
a statute allowing sterilization, in the form of castration, of males convicted of rape,
incest, or crimes against nature. Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 504 (1956). Although it is
not clear from the Oregon Revised Statutes of 1965 if the penal sterilization provision
previously found in Ore. Comp. Laws tit. 127, §§ 801-811 has been repealed, no reference
to sterilization as a punishment appears in the new codification.
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of protecting the commonweal against the procreative powers of
such persons.3' This is not criminal in form, but in the light of
Robinson v. California,"2 the intent of the CES statutes approaches
a theory of criminality. In Robinson the Supreme Court of the
United States determined that it was cruel and unusual punishment
when the state imprisons a man for the psuedo-crime of being a
narcotics addict. The fact that an addict may be a threat to society
does not give the state the right to imprison him. A conditon is not
a crime. Mr. Justice Douglas, for the majority, indicated that it is
cruel and unusual punishment for the state to punish a man for
being addicted to narcotics, and by way of dictum added that the
same would be true of any attempt to punish a man because he
was mentally deficient. The line between punishment and non,
punishment in Robinson was so vague that Mr. Justice Clark's
dissent was premised on the conclusion that California was attempt-
ing to cure rather than penalize the defendant. The line may be
equally difficult to draw in a CES case.
The United States Supreme Court has recently determined
that the state may invade the body of a man in order to remove a
blood sample when he is suspected of driving an automobile while
intoxicated, but noted the extreme limitations placed on the state
when it is dealing with the bodily integrity of its subjects:
* * * The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value
of our society. That we today hold the constitution does not forbid
minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently lim-
ited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions. 33
Sterilization is unquestionably a substantial intrusion into a funda-
mental function of the human body. 4 When the state undertakes
31 Ala. Code tit. 45, § 243 (1958), and Cal. Wei. & Inst. Code, § 6624 (1937), state no
express grounds on which the CES order is to be based.
32 370 U.S. 660, 82 Sup. Ct. 1417 (1962).
33 Schmerber v. California, - U.S. -, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826, 1836 (1966). The Court
was dealing with a self-incrimination problem.
34 In depriving a man of the use of procreative power, the form of bodily intrusion
is of a totally different character than forced vaccination. However, Mr. Justice Holmes
maintained that ".... the principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough
to cover cutting the fallopian tubes." Bell v. Buck, 274 U.S. 200, 208, 47 Sup. Ct. 584, 585
(1925). The comparison has been harshly criticized by legal commentators. Mr. Justice
Douglas has verbalized the substantial character of the bodily intrusion in sterilization
when he described it as leaving the individual with ".... no redemption. Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110, 1113 (1942).
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this intrusion under a theory of protecting itself from a condition
in its defective subject, it approaches very close to the kind of
punishment rejected by the Supreme Court as cruel and unusual
in Robinson v. California.8 Unlike narcotics addict Robinson,
the mental or physical defective is not labeled a criminal by the
CES statute. But because his condition is seen as an anti-social
threat he is forced to surrender a human right which is more funda-
mental than. the ninety days of freedom of which California at-
tempted to deprive narcotics addicts. Can a state escape the force
of the cruel and unusual prohibition by simply denominating its
deprivations as eugenic rather than punitive?
CES AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Is CES a denial of equal protection of the law under the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States? This
has been the most thoroughly litigated constitutional question
affecting CES. It was a key question in the two CES cases deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 6 the court held an order for the sterilization of a pris-
oner to be a denial of equal protection. Jack Skinner had been
convicted once of stealing chickens and twice of robbery. The
Oklahoma statute provided for the eugenic sterilization of habitual
criminals who had twice been convicted of felony involving moral
turpitude. Mr. Justice Douglas spoke for a unanimous court in
holding that this denied Skinner equal protection of the law inas-
much as Oklahoma classified his crimes as involving moral tur-
pitude while excluding embezzlement from the classification. To
impose sterilization on a chicken stealer and robber, while exempt-
ing the embezzler whose thievery might be much greater, was a
denial of the equality of protection required of the states by the
fourteenth amendment.
A different dimension of equal protection under a CES statute
was presented in an earlier Supreme Court decision, Bell v. Buck.37
The Virginia statute provided for the forced sterilization of feeble-
minded persons confined in state institutions but did not cover
such persons at large in the state. It was argued that this was a
35 Supra note 32.
36 316 U.S. 535, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110 (1942).
87 274 U.S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1925).
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failure to apply the eugenic remedy to all the members of the class
to which it should apply and therefore constituted a denial of equal
protection to feebleminded persons held in state institutions. Mr.
Justice Holmes, for the majority, noted that such an argument is
...... the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."38 Attacking
the merits of the argument he admitted that perfect equality did
not exist under the law, but held that the statute aimed at equality
inasmuch as the sterilization of inmates would allow many of them
* . . to be returned to the world, and thus open the asylum to
others."89
The argument dismissed by Mr. Justice Holmes as a last resort
had actually prevailed in three state supreme courts prior to the
decision in Bell. In Smith v. Board of Examiners,0 an epileptic
confined to a state hospital was ordered to submit to a salpin-
gectomy. She successfully argued in the Supreme Court of New
Jersey that the omission of epileptics not confined in state institu-
tions from the ambit of the statute constituted a denial of equal
protection to epileptics who were so confined. The court noted
that the exclusion of epileptics not confined to state institutions
was unreasonable and arbitrary since they were the defectives who
were most likely to have children. The Supreme Court of Michigan
and the New York Court of Appeals reached similar conclusions
in judging statutes which failed to include extra-institutional pro-
visions.4' However, every case in point decided after Bell concluded
that inapplicability to non-institutionalized persons does not violate
the fourteenth amendment.42
Currently, seven states bring all persons at large in the state
under the .provisions of the CES statute.4" One state has a statute
which is extra-institutional as to all feebleminded persons, but
88 Id. at 208. 47 Sup. Ct. at 585.
39 Ibid.
40 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 At. 963 (1913).
41 Osborn v. Thomson, 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N.Y. Supp. 1094 (1918), affirming
In Re Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Haynes v. Lapeer,
201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 930 (1918).
42 State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 Pac. 668 (1931); State v. Schaffer, 126 Kan.
607, 270 Pac. 604 (1928).
43 Del. Code tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705 (1953); Idaho Code tit. 66, §§ 801-812 (1947); Iowa
Code ch, 145, §§ 1-22 (1946); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34, §§ 2461-2468 (1964); N.C. Gen. Stat.
ch. 35, §§ 35-57 (1949); Ore. Rev. Stat. tit. 36, ch. 436, §§ 010-150 (1965); Utah Code
Ann. tit. 64, ch. 10, §§ 1-14 (1953).
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covers only the institutionalized suffering from mental diseases,
sexual perversion or syphilis. 4 The remaining seventeen CES states
have no extra-institutional provisions.4 5
Another aspect of the equal protection question was raised
in Smith v. Command.4 6 A Michigan statute allowed the steriliza-
tion of feebleminded persons, but did not provide for the insane.
The court held that this did not violate equal protection because
the distinction between the two classes was reasonable. Twenty-
three CES states currently permit the sterilization of both the
feebleminded and the insane.47 The court in Smith did find a
portion of the statute violative of equal protection inasmuch as
it applied CES only to defectives whose children would probably
become wards of the state. This was held to constitute an unreason-
able sub-class within a class. 48 Although the probability that chil-
dren of the defective may become dependant on state aid is fre-
quently one of the factors on which a CES order can be based none
of the current CES statutes limit their applicability to such a class.
CES AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Does CES violate the fourteenth amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States by denying substantive due process? If
the policy embodied in the CES statutes is unsound then steriliza-
44 S.D. Code tit. 30, §§ 0501-0514 (1939).
45 One of the seventeen has a seperate statute which achieves a degree of extra-
institutionality in CES. Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 42, § 102 (1956), requires the sterilization of
all persons who have been adjudicated feebleminded or imbecilic, or who have a condi-
tion of hereditary insanity or epilepsy, as a condition precedent to marriage in Nebraska.
46 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925).
47 The exceptions are Georgia and Maine. Ga. Code Ann. tit. 99, §§ 801-012 (1953),
includes "hereditary mental illness" but makes no mention of feeblemindedness. The
reverse is true in Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34, §§ 2461-2468 (1964). This covers only feebleminded-
ness and would seem to exclude an illness such as insanity. The general term "mental
deficiency" used in Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, §§ 501-509 (1956), would seem to include
both insanity and feeblemindedness, as would "mental defectives" used in Ala. Code tit.
45, § 243 (1958), and Mich. Comp. Laws ch. 720, §§ 301-310 (1948). The remaining CES
statutes distinguish and include both the insane and the feebleminded, some using
the equivalent terms mental illness and mental deficiency. Ore. Rev. Stat. tit. 36, ch.
436, §§ 010-150 (1965), is the only statute which uses the correct terms, "mental illness
and mental retardation."
Ariz. Rev. Stat. tit. 36, §§ 531-540 (1956), Del. Code tit. 16, §§ 5710-5705 (1953),
Ind. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 1601-1618 (Bums 1964), Miss. Code Ann. tit. 25, §§ 6957-6964
(1942), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. XII, ch. 147, §§ 1-14 (1955), S.C. Code tit. 32, §§ 671-672
(1962), and W. Va. Code ch. 16, §§ 1394-1400 (1961) include only that form of insanity
which is recurrent and hereditary. S.D. Code tit. 30, §§ 0501-0514 (1939), lists only that
insanity which is an "inheritable mental disease."
48 The clause being separable, the entire statute was not held unconstitutional.
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tions ordered under them would be an unreasonable exercise of
the police power. In this perspective the theory of eugenics be-
comes critical to an analysis of the constitutional status of CES.
This was recognized in the early litigation of CES cases, and a
substantial amount of attention was given to scientific opinion in
the first decisions on the subject. The cases were determined on
other considerations, the courts being reluctant to approve or dis-
approve the scientific learning of the legislatures, but serious
doubts about eugenics were at first expressed by the judiciary.
Smith v. Command49 was the first case in which a court clearly
expressed a conviction that the eugenic theory was certain enough
to support CES legislation:
.... Measured by its injurious effect upon society, what right has
any class of citizens to beget children with an inherited tendency
to crime, feeblemindedness, idiocy, or imbecility?50
It remained for the Supreme Court of the United States,
within a few months of the decision in Smith, to verbalize the law's
acceptance of the eugenic theory in Bell v. Buck.51 Carrie Buck was
an eighteen-year-old imbecile confined to a Virginia state mental
hospital. Her mother and illegimate daughter were also imbeciles. 52
An order for her sterilization was upheld by the Supreme Court
of Virginia.53 Speaking for the majority' in the United States
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Holmes based the court's affirmation
squarely on the reasonableness of the eugenic theory:
.... The attack is not upon the procedural but upon the sub-
stantive law .... we have seen more than once that the public
welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength
of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often felt not to be such by
49 Supra note 46.
50 231 Mich. 409, 421, 204 N.W. 140, 149 (1925).
51 274 U.S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1925).
52 The statement of facts by the Court has been challenged by a sociologist who
claims to have made an investigation of the case. Dr. J. E. Coogan claims that Carrie
and her mother were morons and were thus considerably more intelligent than imbeciles.
He disputes the "three generations of imbeciles are enough" rhetoric of Mr. Justice
Holmes on the grounds that the third generation, Carrie's daughter, was probably above
average in intelligence. As to her alleged imbecility, this judgment was made by a nurse
who observed her at one month of age. Her subsequent school record indicates that she
was a bright child. See Coogan, Eugenic Sterilization, The Catholic World 45 (April 1953).
Coogan's study at least indicates the kind of factual morass which can confront a court
in a CES case.
53 143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516 (1925).
54 Mr. Justice Butler dissented but did not file an opinion.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with in-
competence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for
their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind .... [T]hree generations of imbeciles
are enough.55
So comprehensive was the court's approval of the eugenic
theory that the scientific basis of CES has rarely been challenged
in court since 1925. In 1928 the Supreme Court of Kansas cited
Bell as precluding an argument that CES violated substantive due
process.5" Three years later the Supreme Court of Idaho would not
even allow itself a doubt about the validity of the eugenic theory:
... . [There is] no doubt in our minds that heredity plays a con-
trolling part in the blight of feeblemindedness. If there be any nat-
ural right for natively mental defectives to beget children, that right
must give way to the police power of the state in protecting the
common welfare.57
This is not to say that the legal community has accepted the eugenic
theory as a reasonable basis for CES legislation. 8 The concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Skinner v. Oklahoma verbalized
the doubts of many legal commentators:
. . - . I think also the present plan to sterilize the individual in
pursuit of a eugenic plan to eliminate from the race characteristics
that are only vaguely identified and which in our present state of
knowledge are uncertain as to transmissibility presents constitu-
tional questions of gravity.5 9
The doubts expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson were caused
by the retreat which biologists and researchers had made from
the sweeping generalizations about heredity prevailing in the
early twentieth century. In 1936 the American Neurological As-
65 Supra note 51, at 208, 47 Sup. Ct. at 585.
56 State v. Schaffer, 126 Kan. 607, 270 Pac. 604 (1928).
57 State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 677, 299 Pac. 668, 670 (1931).
58 See Bligh, Sterilization and Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1965); Kalven,
A Special Corner of Civil Liberties, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1234 (1965); O'Hara and Sanks,
Eugenic Sterilization, 45 Geo. L.J. 20 (1956); Zenoff, Reappraisal of Eugenic Sterilization
Laws, 10 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 149 (1961); 38 Ind. L.J. 275 (1963); 35 Iowa L. Rev. 253 (1950).
Somewhat typical of the criticism of Mr. Justice Holmes for his outspoken defense
of the eugenic theory as embodied in the Virginia statutes are the comments of Gest
in Justice Holmes v. Natural Law, 23 Temp. L.Q. 306 (1950): (The decision in Bel)" . . .
[I]s the product of a juristic philosophy in complete discord with that on which our
principles of law are founded. . . . [T]he opinion is noteworthy for the boldness with
which Justice Holmes . . . agrees to the subordination of human rights to the supposed
expediency of a long range racial improvement."
59 316 U.S. 535, 546, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110, 1116 (1942).
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sociation issued a report which was critical of the overwhelming
emphasis being given to heredity as a cause of feeblemindedness. 60
The volume of scientific criticism of the eugenic theory increased
in the following years. Even the most enthusiastic eugenicists
began to reduce their earlier claims, and greater attention was paid
to environmental factors in programs for racial improvement. 61 Yet
the CES statutes have been virtually untouched by these develop-
ments. While no new states have adopted CES since 1937, only one
state (Kansas) has abandoned the practice.
What are the principal objections to CES as an unreasonable
excerise of the police power? They are numerous and detailed, and
one who hopes to make a thorough analysis of them must read
widely in the numerous journals which contain articles on the re-
lationship of heredity to particular deficiencies. 62 Within the limits
of the present article only a superficial summary of these objections
can be given.
The first principle on which CES is premised is that human
defects are transmitted through inevitable laws of heredity, or as
Mr. Justice Holmes expressed it in Bell v. Buck- those who "sap
the strength of the state . . . (continue) their kind."6 3
The laws of all twenty-five CES states permit the sterilization
of mental defectives if there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the defect will be transmitted to children. Typically, the
operation is required when the person is the ". . . . probable
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring"6 or is a potential
producer of "..... offspring with inherited inferior or anti-social
traits." The problem is this: can a state agency reasonably make
60 Report of the Committee of the American Neurological Association for the In-
vestigation of Eugenical Sterilization; the report is summarized in 1 American J. of Medi-
cal Jurisprudence 253 (1938) and analyzed in Myerson, Certain Medical and Legal Phases
o1 Eugenic Sterilization, 52 Yale L.J. 618 (1943).
61 When the CES statutes were enacted the eugenicists were so opposed to consider-
ing the role of environment in racial improvement that the theory of euthenics was
absolutely rejected by them. As late as 1943 Professor Walter Wheeler Cook could pose
the choice Eugenics or Euthenics? in 37 Il1. L. Rev. 287.
62 Some of the better source materials for such readings will be found in the Amer-
ican Journal of Human Genetics, American J. of Mental Deficiency, Annuals of Eugenics,
Eugenics Quarterly, Eugenics Review, J. of Mental Science, J. of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, Journal of Heredity, and Science.
63 274 U.S. 200, 208, 47 Sup. Ct. 584, 585 (1925).
64 W. Va. Code ch. 16, § 1394 (1961).
65 N.D. Cent. Code tit. 23 § 0803 (1960).
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such a judgment of a mental defective in the light of current sci-
entific knowledge? It is probable that mental deficiency or a ten-
dency to mental disease is inheritable, 6 but the elements and extent
of transmissibility is unknown. The once generally accepted view
that a single gene in each parent will be responsible for mental
condition, an idea based on Mendel's study of vegetable life, is
now universally rejected. 7 To the unknown extent that heredity
may be the cause of transmission of mental defect and deficiency,
hundreds of genetic elements are probably responsible. It may be
possible, for example, that two feebleminded parents will probably
produce children with a tendency toward feeblemindedness; it may
also be impossible, from a genetic point of view, for them to beget
such children. But science has not discovered the genetic key which
would enable man to know how the process works. Even though
heredity may be as important as environment in causing mental
defect (which most scientists would dispute) it is impossible to
blueprint the hundreds of genetic elements in one parent which
would interact with hundreds of genetic elements in the other
parent.
It is difficult to see how a board of physicians and civil servants
can make even an educated guess as to whether the person whose
record is before them will probably be the parent of a mentally
defective child. A geneticist would say that such a judgment is
impossible; should not the legal community admit that it is at
least highly speculative? Can speculation give the state a right to
destroy the bodily integrity of its subjects? This question was raised
even in reference to voluntary eugenic sterilization by a committee
of the American Medical Association in 1937:
66 See 57 American J. of Mental Deficiency 123 (1962).
67 A tendency to manic-depressive insanity may be transmitted by several genes in
one parent, but it is certain that environmental stresses must also be present to actualize
it. However, it frequently appears only when the person is past the normal years of
procreative activity. The extremely rare form of insanity known as Huntington's chorea
is caused by a single dominant gene in one parent. In the unknown degree that heredity
influences the transmission of other forms of insanity, such as schizophrenia and psycho-
pathic personality, multiple genetic factors in both parents are involved and certain
environmental conditions are prerequisite to actual illness.
Among the grades of feeblemindedness, there is even more complexity in genetic
contribution than is the case with insanity. The'highest type, morons (who are the
mental deficients most likely to be born of feebleminded parents), probably have re-
ceived a tendency toward the condition from multiple genetic factors contributed by
both parents. The environmental factor is probably more significant than imbecility and
idiocy, but the hereditary factors are extremely complex.
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. . Present knowledge regarding human heredity is so limited
that there appears to be very little scientific basis to justify limita-
tion of conception for eugenic reasons. . . . There is conflicting
evidence regarding the transmissibility of epilepsy and mental dis-
orders.68
Under the CES statutes the determining board may usually con-
sider any relevant information in deciding if a particular person
is unsuited to procreate. But even if environmental factors are
given considerable weight the judgment will still be highly specu-
lative. Not only are environmental factors frequently unknown
and unpredictable before conception, they are also the subject of
much scientific dispute and contradiction. Is this sufficient to con-
stitute due process of law in a CES order?
Fifteen states permit the forced sterilization of epileptics.69 It
is unquestionable that heredity is sometimes a factor in the trans-
mission of epilepsy, but the probability and form of transmission
is impossible to estimate. Human knowledge about the disease
would best be described as elementary; at best the judgment of a
eugenics board would be extremely speculative in determining
that an epileptic person will probably produce an epileptic child.
70
From the viewpoint of substantive due process the sterilization
of criminals on eugenic grounds is indefensible. Sexual perversion
or habitual criminality is a social problem; crime has nothing to do
with biology. No reputable authority any longer defends the thesis
that criminality is inheritable.7' Nevertheless, eight states allow
CES on grounds of criminality.7 2
68 Report of the American Medical Assn.'s Committee to Study Contraceptive Prac-
tices, A.M.A. Proc. 54 (May, 1937).
69 Ariz. Code tit. 45, § 243 (1958); Del. Code tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705 (1953); Ga. Code
Ann. tit. 99, U 1301-1319 (1953); Idaho Code tit. 66, §§ 801-812 (1947); Ind. Stat. Ann.
tit. 22, §§ 1601-1618 (Bums 1964); Iowa Code ch. 145, §§ 1-22 (1946); Miss. Code Ann.
tit. 25, §§ 6957-6964 (1942); Mont. Rev. Stat. tit. 38, §§ 601-608 (1947); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. XII, ch. 174, §§ 1-14 (1955); N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 35, §§ 35-37 (1949); Okla. Stat.
tit. 43a, §§ 341-346 (1951); S.C. Code tit. 32, §§ 671-672 (1962); Utah Code Ann. tit. 64,
ch. 10, §§ 1-14 (1953); Va. Code tit. 37, §§ 231-246 (1950); W. Va. Code ch. 16, §§ 1394-1400
(1961).
70 Myodonic epilepsy is transmissible through heredity. The condition is rare. As
to the common forms of the disease heredity is probably a factor in only about one-
fourth of the cases. Even then, what is passed is a predisposition due to weaknesses in
the nervous system or brain. The predisposition is actualized only under certain en-
vironmental conditions. Only a small percentage of epileptics are mentally defective,
and in most cases this is due to brain injury rather than any hereditary contribution.
71 Cesare Lombroso popularized the theory of familial criminality in the nineteenth
century. The last reputable scholar to support a theory of inherited criminality was the
late Professor Ernest Hooton of Harvard University. For an analysis of the reasons
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Iowa and South Dakota have a somewhat unusual provision
in their CES statutes.7 They permit the sterilization of syphilitic
persons. Although syphilis has nothing to do with genetics these
provisions may not be open to a due process objection in the same
degree as the mental defects and epileptic classifications discussed
above. The probability of the bacterium killing or seriously harm-
ing the embryo or fetus may provide a non-speculative and reason-
able basis for an order of sterilization.
Georgia allows the sterilization of any person confined in a
state institution who has any hereditary physical defect or disease.74
The reasonableness of such a sweeping classification is at best
doubtful.
In a concurring opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma, Mr. Chief
Justice Stone expressed the thought that ".... the state may protect
itself from demonstrably inheritable tendencies of the individual
which are injurious to society.75 Whether the tendencies enu-
merated in the CES statutes are demonstrably inheritable is obvi-
ously critical from a constitutional viewpoint. The overwhelming
weight of scientific opinion is that they are not demonstrably
inheritable in the case of an individual defective person.
The second principle underlying CES is that defective human
beings breed more frequently than normal persons and thus
why such a theory is universally rejected see: Montagu, The Biologist Looks at Crime,
27 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 46 (1941); Montagu,
Human Heredity ch. 9 (paperback edition 1960); and Popenoe, Sterilization and Crim-
inality, 53 A.B.A. Rep. 575 (1928).
72 Del. Code tit. 16, 4§ 5701-5705 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stat. tit. 17, ch. 299, §§ 17-19
(1958); Idaho Code tit. 66, §§ 801-812 (1947); Iowa Code ch. 145, 1 1022 (1946); Neb. Rev.
Stat. ch. 83, §§ 501-509 (1956); N.D. Cent. Code tit. 23, §§ 0801-0815 (1960); Utah Code
Ann. tit. 64, ch. 10, §§ 1-14 (1953).
Although Cal. Pen. Code tit. 1, § 2670 (1960), is part of the Penal Code, and separate
from the CES provision found in Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code, § 6624 (1937), that statute is
eugenic rather than punitive in form. However, California does have an expressly puni-
tive sterilization statute which applies to those convicted of carnal abuse of a child under
ten years of age. Cal. Pen. Code tit. 45, § 645 (1960). Nebraska also has a statute allowing
sterilization, in the form of castration, of males convicted of rape, incest, or crimes
against nature. Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 504 (1956). Although it is not clear from the
Oregon Revised Statutes of 1965 if the penal sterilization provision previously found
in Ore. Comp. Laws tit. 127, §§ 801-811 has been repealed, no reference to sterilization
as a punishment appears in the codification.
73 Iowa Code ch. 145, §§ 1-22 (1946); S.D. Code tit. 50, §§ 0501-0514 (1939).
74 Ga. Code Ann. tit. 99, §§ 1301-1319 (1953). The classification is so broad as to
include defects and diseases as asthma, bronchitis, baldness, cataracts, color blindness,
congenital heart disease, diabetes, and rickets.
75 316 U.S. 535, 574, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110, 1115 (1942).
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threaten to overrun society with inferior offspring. Mr. Justice
Holmes described the purpose of CES as being ". . . . to prevent
our being swamped with incompetence. ' 76 Yet the report of the
American Neurological Association on eugenic sterilization in-
dicated that ". . . . the reputedly high fecundity of the mentally
defective is a myth." 77 Eighty-nine percent of all feebleminded
children are born to normal parents, 7 which indicates that even
if heredity is assigned a dominant role in producing feebleminded-
ness the overwhelming number of carriers are not themselves af-
flicted. Authorities have estimated that even if all persons mani-
festing the defect were sterilized in each generation it would take
centuries or even millenniums to effectuate a substantial reduc-
tion in the incidence of even a defect which is primarily caused
by hereditary factors.79 Professor Walter Wheeler Cook has con-
servatively concluded that ". . . . since sterilization affects very
little the reservoir of carriers little progress would be made in
reducing the feebleminded in succeeding generations.""0
The third basic principle of CES is that sterilization is not
usually felt to be a detriment by the defective person. Mr. Justice
Holmes expressed this belief when he wrote that the loss of repro-
ductive power is ". . . . often not felt to be [a sacrifice] . . . by those
concerned.""' This may be true in the case of many imbeciles,
idiots and persons prone to sexual perversion. But it can hardly be
generalized of those suffering from feeblemindedness and epilepsy.
One recent study indicated that many mental defectives who were
forcibly sterilized by the state of California feel resentment.82
Others are aware that eugenic sterilization is contrary to the teach-
ing of their religion. 3 Some women who are capable of caring for
76 274 U.S. 200, 208, 47 Sup. Ct. 584, 585 (1925).
77 Report of the Committee of the American Neurological Association for the In-
vestigation of Eugenical Sterilization; the report is summarized in I American J. of
Medical Jurisprudence 253 (1938), and analyzed in Myerson, Certain Medical and Legal
Phases of Eugenic Sterilization, 52 Yale L.J. 618, 628 (1943).
78 Fisher, Elimination of Mental Defect. 18 J. of Heredity 529 (1927).
79 Sce Montagu, Human Heredity 259 (paperback edition 1960); Scheinfeld, The
Basic Facts of Human Heredity 251 (paperback edition 1961); and Cook, Eugenics or
Euthenics?, 37 ill. L. Rev. 287 (1943).
80 Cook, Eugenics or Euthenics?, 37 11. L. Rev. 287, 295 (1943).
81 Supra note 76, at 208, 47 Sup. Ct. at 585.
82 Sabagh and Edgerton, Sterilized Mental Defectives Look at Eugenic Sterilization,
9 Eugenics Quarterly 215 (1962). Compare Woodside, Sterilization in North Carolina 66
(1950).
83 Jews reject sterilization on theological grounds, especially Deuteronomy 23:2. The
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the children of others, but have been forced to undergo CES, can
only be described as bitter. The state has precluded their becoming
mothers on the basis of ". .. . a knowledge of the laws of heredity
far beyond the reaches yet attained by humble scientists." 4
Any analysis of CES must ultimately reach this fundamental
question: is the basis for this state action so apparent and reason-
able that the legislature can authorize a substantial intrusion into
the body of a human being? Mr. Justice Douglas has stated the
seriousness of the answer to that question:
.... We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of
the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are funda-
mental to the existence and survival of the race. There is no re-
demption for the individual whom the law touches ... he is for-
ever deprived of a basic liberty.8 5
CES AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Is CES a denial of procedural due process? The argument in
Bell v. Buck80 centered on equal protection and substantive due
process in the exercise of the police powers. The approval of the
statute involved in that case forced the opponents of CES to turn
to attacks on the procedure under which a sterilization order was
entered. In State v. Schaffer,7 it was argued that failure to provide
for appeal from the administrative board entering the order was a
denial of due process. However, the court held that due process
requires neither judicial process nor a right to appeal. No court
has reached a contrary conclusion in an actual case, but an advisory
opinion given by the Supreme Court of Alabama indicated that
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States
requires that a person who has been ordered to submit to CES
have ". . . . an untrammeled right to appeal to a court." 88
Nazi use of CES has strengthened Jewish opposition; see the comments of Rabbi Rackman.
A Jewish View, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1210 (1956). A few Catholic theologians at one time
defended CES; see Lehane, The Morality of American Civil Legislation Concerning
Eugenical Sterilization (1944), for a discussion of these writers. Eventually Catholic opinion
became unanimous against CES and in 1931 Pope Pius XI condemned the practice. Some
Protestant theologians have defended CES; some oppose it. The Lambeth Conference of
1958 (Anglican), which has had a worldwide impact on -Protestant thinking about con-
ception control condemned CES.
84 Deutsch, The Mentally IIl in America 375 (2d edition 1949).
85 Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110, 1113 (1942).
88 274 U.S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1925).
87 126 Kan. 607, 270 Pac. 604 (1928).
88 In re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 551, 162 So. 123, 128 (1935).
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Currently four CES states have no provision for appeal to a
judicial body."9 The remaining twenty-one CES states allow an
appeal to the county court, with the right to prosecute the appeal
to the supreme court of the state. Arizona, Georgia, Montana and
North Dakota require a trial de novo in the county court.9 0 In
seventeen states the county court would presumably be limited to
reviewing the action of the administrative board.
No case has involved a challenge to the competence of the
agency empowered to issue the order of sterilization. In Michigan
and Indiana a court can issue the order under certain circum-
stances."" Other agencies empowered to issue the original order
are state boards of eugenics created expressly for the purpose,92
governing boards of the institution in which the defective person
is confined,93 boards of medical examiners,94 superintendents of
institutions, 5 special boards appointed to hear the specific case, 96
state departments of health, 97 a state welfare department,9 and
the board of commissioners of the county in which the defective
person lives.99
The competence of a court to order a eugenic sterilization in
a state which does not have a CES statute was raised in one reported
case, In Re Simpson.0 0 Nora Ann Simpson was an attractive eigh-
teen year old girl who appeared normal at first sight. However,
89 Ala. Code tit. 45, § 243 (1958); Conn. Gen. Stat. tit. 17, ch. 299, §§ 17-19 (1958);
Del. Code tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705 (1953); Wis. Stat. Ann. tit. VII, ch. 46, § 12 (1923).
90 In Georgia and Montana there is a right to a jury trial.
91 Ind. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 1601-1618 (Bums 1964), permits the judge who commits
a person to a mental institution to order him sterilized. Mich. Comp. Laws ch. 720,
§ 301-310 (1948).
92 Ga. Code Ann. tit. 99, §§ 1301-1319 (1953); Idaho Code tit. 66, §§ 801-812 (1947);
Iowa Code ch.-145, §§ 1-22 (1946); Mont. Rev. Code tit. 38, §§ 601-608 (1947); N.C. Gen.
Stat. ch. 35, §§ 35-57 (1949); Ore. Rev. Stat. tit. 36, ch. 436, §§ 010-150 (1965).
93 Miss. Code Ann. tit. 25, §§ 6957-6964 (1942); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. XII, ch.
174, §§ 1-14 (1955); Utah Code Ann. tit. 64, ch. 10, §§ 1-14 (1953).
94 Ariz. Code tit. 36, §§ 531-540 (1956); Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, §§ 501-509 (1956);
N.D. Cent. Code tit. 23, §§ 0801-0815 (1960).
95 Ala. Code tit. 45, § 243 (1958).
96 Conn. Gen. Stat. tit. 17, ch. 299, §§ 17-19 (1958); Del. Code tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705
(1953).
97 Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code, § 6624 (1937); Ind. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 1601-1618 (Bums
1964); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34, §§ 2461-2468 (1964); Okla. Stat. tit. 43a, §§ 341-346 (1951);
(Bd. of Mental Health); S.C. Code tit. 32, §§ 671-672 (1962); Va. Code tit. 37, §§ 231-246
(1950), (Hospital Board); W. Va. Code ch. 16, §§ 1394-1400 (1961).
98 Wis. Stat. Ann. tit. VII, ch. 46, § 12 (1923).
99 S.D. Code tit. 30, §§ 0501-0514 (1939).
100 180 N.E.2d 206 (1962), noted in 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1359 (1963).
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she had an I.Q. of 36. She had given birth to one illegitimate child.
A petition was filed with the Probate Court of Zanseville County,
Ohio, requesting her confinement to a state mental institution, but
there were no vacancies. Her mother then requested the Judge to
order her sterilization. The Judge granted the petition on the
theory that the statute giving probate courts plenary power to
provide care for the feebleminded, in consideration of the good
of society, gave him the right to order a eugenic sterilization. The
opinion of the court also asserted general equity jurisdiction to
order such a sterilization. 10 1 A situation of this kind has never
reached an appellate court.
The one successful constitutional challenge to the procedure
followed under a CES statute has been based on the failure to
provide for notice and contest. In Brewer v. Valk, 10 2 the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held this omission fatal to the statute.
In In Re Hendrickson,0 3 the father of an insane boy who had
been ordered sterilized protested the order. An injunction was
issued restraining a vasectomy. The Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed the issuance of the injunction on the theory that a failure
to provide notice and a right of contest before the administrative
board was a denial of due process. The right to appeal to a
court after the issuance of the order did not save the statute. A
contrary result was reached in Garcia v. State Dep't of Institu-
tions,10 4 where the Supreme Court of California held that a CES
statute did not withhold due process by failing to provide for notice,
contest, or appeal. The court gave no reasons for its decision.
CONCLUSION
At Nuremberg, American judges condemned the Nazi use of
the German CES laws to eliminate "undesirable" characteristics
. 101 No authorities specifically in point were cited to support the claim that the
statute gave the probate court power to sterilize. The court cited an unreported Mary.
land case, Ex Parte Eaton, Baltimore Circuit Court, Nov. 10, 1954, as authority for the
proposition that power to order a eugenic sterilization is implicit in equity jurisdiction.
However, there is no historical basis for such power. The king entrusted the chancellor
with the care of lunatics, but this was probably a delegation of the king's personal re-
sponsibility to his advisor; the equity court over which the chancellor presided never
exerted general power over the lives of lunatics. In Bea.1 v. Smith, 10 Ch. 85 (1873), the
Court of Chancery held that there was no general equity jurisdiction over the affairs
of incompetents.
102 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933).
103 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942).
104 36 Cal. App. 2d 152, 97 P.2d 264 (1939).
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from the race, but it was the American states which had "pio-
neered" the use of CES. The law is only as strong as the protection
which it gives to its weakest subjects. Viewed by the standards of
the Constitution of the United States, twenty-five states retain
laws which are open to gross abuse of the rights of the most depen-
dent and weakest citizens. It is no consolation to the legal com-
munity that CES is less frequently used today than it was two
decades ago. This is less than consoling to the imprisoned, feeble-
minded, insane or epileptic citizen who will this year lose his right
to have children on the basis of a disputed theory. The legislatures
of CES states should admit that this is the one instance in which the
wisdom of the common law and the experience of the centuries
were ignored in an attempt to force "scientific" thinking into the
law. Respect for Mr. Justice Holmes must not prevent the courts
from admitting the fallacious absurdity of his reasoning in Bell v.
Buck. Our science, our common sense, but most importantly our
Constitution demand an end to CES in the United States.
